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Abstract
Most state-of-the-art machine learning (ML) classifica-
tion systems are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.
As a consequence, adversarial robustness poses a signifi-
cant challenge for the deployment of ML-based systems in
safety- and security-critical environments like autonomous
driving, disease detection or unmanned aerial vehicles. In
the past years we have seen an impressive amount of publi-
cations presenting more and more new adversarial attacks.
However, the attack research seems to be rather unstruc-
tured and new attacks often appear to be random selec-
tions from the unlimited set of possible adversarial attacks.
With this publication, we present a structured analysis of the
adversarial attack creation process. By detecting different
building blocks of adversarial attacks, we outline the road
to new sets of adversarial attacks. We call this the ”attack
generator”. In the pursuit of this objective, we summarize
and extend existing adversarial perturbation taxonomies.
The resulting taxonomy is then linked to the application
context of computer vision systems for autonomous vehi-
cles, i.e. semantic segmentation and object detection. Fi-
nally, in order to prove the usefulness of the attack gener-
ator, we investigate existing semantic segmentation attacks
with respect to the detected defining components of adver-
sarial attacks.
1. Introduction
Recent advances in the field of machine learning have
aroused the interest to apply these techniques in safety-
and security-critical application contexts. One example is
the integration of convolutional neural network-based dense
classifiers into autonomous cars [23, 16]. In this challeng-
ing domain, we require not only a high accuracy on the true
underlying data distribution, but also the trained ML mod-
ule to be able to deal with maliciously crafted inputs.
Unfortunately, the last few years have shown that cur-
rent state-of-the-art ML algorithms, in particular deep neu-
ral networks, are quite brittle. With the publications of
Szegedy et al. [38] and Goodfellow et al. [18] as a starting
point, adversarial examples have been recognized as signif-
icant weak points.
An adversarial example is an input data point that is
slightly perturbed by an adversarial perturbation to cause
misclassifications. These adversarial perturbations are cre-
ated by an adversary with the help of an adversarial attack
and are often hard to detect or even imperceptible to the hu-
man eye. The imperceptibility is not only challenging for
the desired deployment in safety- and security-critical in-
dustries, but also hints at a crucial difference between the
sensory information processing in humans and in artificial
neural networks [7]. Since the discovery of this vulnerabil-
ity, a lot of different adversarial attacks and defenses have
been published, e.g. [11, 10, 37]. It has become an arms
race between attackers and defenders [33].
The development of new adversarial attacks remains to
be one key objective of adversarial robustness research.
This is due to the fact that adversarial attacks play a cen-
tral role in the context of robustifying ML systems, as well
as during the evaluation of adversarial robustness. For ex-
ample, adversarial attacks are often part of a defense strat-
egy. Currently, there does not exist any defense mechanism
that is fully satisfactory, although adversarial training shows
promising results. Adversarial training integrates adversar-
ial examples into the training procedure, i.e. the neural net-
work is trained on a mixture of clean and adversarial data
points [39, 20, 25]. Thus, this defense strongly depends
on adversarial attacks, which can provide the needed adver-
sarial perturbations. At the same time, adversarial attacks
are also central for the evaluation of whether or not a deep
neural network is robust. Ideally, the robustness evaluation
process should be independent of concrete attacks and in-
stead, build on provable verification techniques, i.e. meth-
ods that can issue robustness guarantees [40, 13]. Unfor-
tunately, these provable approaches are not yet scalable to
complex tasks like semantic segmentation or object detec-
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tion. As a consequence, one has to again rely on a set of
adversarial attacks for the evaluation process.
This raises the question how one can develop large, di-
verse sets of strong adversarial attacks, which can help
with the hardening and the evaluation of neural networks.
Although the attack research is flourishing, this question
has not been answered. Even the leading software tool-
boxes, like the Adversarial Robustness Toolbox [29], Clev-
erHans [30] or the Foolbox [34], still offer rather limited
collections of benchmark attacks. This also implies that
most of the defense proposals are only evaluated against
a handful of arbitrarily selected attacks. Furthermore, we
still miss broadly accepted attack-based benchmark chal-
lenges for safety- and security-critical tasks. These con-
straints are the result of the current modus operandi in
the development of new attacks. Adversarial attacks are
basically published one by one with a fixed threat model
in mind. For example, the first wave of adversarial at-
tacks was very much fixated on white-box, targeted attacks
with Lp-imperceptibility constraints for simple classifica-
tion tasks [43].
Up until now, we missed the chance to analyze adversar-
ial attacks on a structural level. A structural analysis helps
us understand the defining parts of an adversarial attack,
i.e. see an adversarial attack as a composition of various
elements. In this way, one could shift the research focus
from arbitrarily assembled attacks to defining new poten-
tial elements of the detected building blocks of an attack.
This view would directly increase the number of adversar-
ial attacks significantly, since every new element implies a
large number of new adversarial attacks, namely all poten-
tial combinations with other compatible building block ele-
ments. This modular structure of an attack has already been
partially recognized by the research community within the
discussion of imperceptibility metrics [24]. Every adversar-
ial attack contains some kind of imperceptibility measure.
Traditionally, there has been a strong focus on Lp-norms
as the driver of imperceptibility to the human eye [36].
Recently, a lot of publications suggest other quantifiers to
measure perceptual similarity within an adversarial attack,
e.g. [14, 41]. This is already a significant progress, since
every known adversarial attack can now be updated by ex-
changing Lp-balls with these new proposed measures.
In this paper, we take a first step towards the detection of
structural similarities between adversarial attacks. We ac-
knowledge that adversarial attacks can be viewed as (con-
strained) optimization problems combined with optimiza-
tion methods, which try to find a solution of the optimiza-
tion problem. With the help of an adversarial perturbation
taxonomy, we further define building blocks and various in-
fluencing factors of the optimization problem and optimiza-
tion method of an adversarial attack. Finally, we test our
conceptual ideas by analyzing prominent existing attacks.
In summary, our key contributions are:
• We consolidate and extend existing adversarial perturba-
tion taxonomy approaches. The different dimensions of
the proposed taxonomy are then equipped with potential
options for the adversary, which are loosely connected to
the computer vision task for autonomous driving. How-
ever, the taxonomy can easily be applied to other do-
mains by adjusting the options within the taxonomy di-
mensions.
• We argue that adversarial attacks are a composition of
different quantifiers / measures, which can be grouped
and can be directly linked to the different dimensions and
options of the taxonomy. We then suggest a deeper inves-
tigation of new measures linked to the taxonomy dimen-
sions. In this way, we pave the way to the fast generation
of new attack sets, i.e. outline the ”attack generator”.
• We validate our conceptual ideas by investigating the
semantic segmentation adversarial attacks introduced
in [27]. Furthermore, we present first small experiments,
where we deduce new attacks by exchanging various
measures of the original attack formulations.
2. Taxonomy of Adversarial Perturbations
In this section we want to taxonomize adversarial pertur-
bations along multiple dimensions, hence describe differ-
ent classes of adversarial perturbations. These classes are
helpful in a variety of contexts. Especially when consid-
ering adversarial robustness as a security issue, it becomes
crucial to analyze essential properties of a realistic threat.
In the past, publications were largely concerned with per-
turbation classes, which do not relate to specific security
concerns [17]. Thus, there is an obvious need to further
clarify realistic threat scenarios, in order to close the gap
between the literature and the concerns related to the actual
deployment of ML systems. It has to be noted that what
constitutes a relevant, realistic threat is highly application-
specific. However, a general taxonomy can provide the nec-
essary structural framework for this risk evaluation.
Taxonomy approaches for adversarial perturbations, ad-
versarial examples or adversarial attacks have already been
presented in several publications, e.g. [35, 9, 43, 17, 31]. In
the following, we consolidate and extend these taxonomy
approaches. Additionally, we explore options within the
different dimensions of the taxonomy. While the dimen-
sions of the taxonomy are application independent, some of
the options are motivated by the computer vision task for
autonomous driving. The dimensions of this taxonomy pro-
posal are inspired by the framework for empirical evaluation
of classifier security presented in [4, 5].
In general, we recognize two central questions when
classifying adversarial perturbations: Who created the ad-
versarial perturbation? And which attack strategy led him
to the perturbation at hand? As a consequence, the proposed
taxonomy consists of the two high-level dimensions ”threat
model” and ”attack strategy”. The threat model summa-
rizes the most important information about the adversary.
Influenced by his goals, knowledge and constraints, the ad-
versary then develops an attack strategy, which ultimately
results in an adversarial attack and thus, the considered ad-
versarial perturbation.
2.1. Threat Model
The threat model characterizes the attacker. It usu-
ally specifies his goals, knowledge and capabilities (con-
straints). Thus, we suggest to further decompose the threat
model into these three sub-dimensions.
2.1.1 Adversary’s Goals
The overall objective of the adversary is to force the victim
model to make mistakes with the help of an adversarial
perturbation. But this rather broad goal can be further
specified by discussing the type of output the adversary
desires (specificity) and defining the scope in which
the perturbation should be successful in harming the
ML system (perturbation scope). Furthermore, one key
premise of an adversarial perturbation is that it should be
imperceptible or inconspicuous. Since imperceptibility is
still a very abstract concept, the adversary usually has a
more specific type of imperceptibility in mind (perturbation
imperceptibility). We will now go through the different
aspects of the adversary’s goals and equip them with
suitable options for the adversary. It should be noted that
options are not necessarily mutually exclusive. This will
also be true for options presented in other dimensions of
the taxonomy.
Specificity: What are the desired consequences of the
adversarial perturbation?
• Untargeted (Non-targeted): The goal is to craft a per-
turbation which results in as many misclassifications as
possible. There is no preference concerning the appear-
ing classes in the adversarial output [1].
• Static Target: The perturbation should lead to a fixed
classification output, which is essentially independent of
the input point added to the perturbation [27]. For ex-
ample, the perturbation always forces the victim model
to output one fixed image of an empty street without any
pedestrians or cars in sight.
• Dynamic Target: This type of goal has also been intro-
duced by Metzen et al. [27] in the context of attacking
semantic image segmentation. Here, the adversarial per-
turbation aims at keeping the ML module’s output un-
changed with the exception of removing certain target
classes. The desired classification output depends on the
input point which is combined with the crafted pertur-
bation. Removing the pedestrian class in every possible
traffic situation is an example for a dynamic target objec-
tive.
• Confusing Target (Confusion): The adversarial perturba-
tion should keep the classification output unchanged with
the exception of changing the position or size of certain
target classes. As in the dynamic target setting, the de-
sired output is related to the considered input image. As
an example, one can think of an adversarial perturbation
that reduces the size of pedestrians and in this way leads
to a false sense of distance.
Perturbation Scope: What is the desired application scope
of the adversarial perturbation?
• Individual Scope: The perturbation is crafted for one spe-
cific input image, i.e. one specific adversarial example
is the target of the adversary. It is not necessary that
the same perturbation fools the ML system on other data
points.
• Contextual Scope: The goal is to create a fixed image-
agnostic perturbation that causes label changes for one
or more specific contextual situations. For example, the
perturbation works for traffic situations on snowy or rainy
days and is then able to fool the victim model under the
majority of angles, distances and lighting effects.
• Universal Scope: The goal is to create a fixed image-
agnostic perturbation that causes label changes for a sig-
nificant part of the true data distribution with no explicit
contextual dependencies. This scope has first been pro-
posed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [28] and has been fur-
ther analyzed in [27, 32].
Perturbation Imperceptibility: In which way should the
perturbation be imperceptible?
• Lp-based Imperceptibility: Due to small changes with re-
spect to some Lp-norm, the human observer should not
be able to detect the adversarial perturbation when ap-
plied to one or more input images.
• Attention-based Imperceptibility: Due to unremarkable
changes, the human observer should not be able to detect
the adversarial perturbation when applied to one or more
input data points. These unremarkable changes are not
motivated by a Lp-norm, but are rather the result of other
measures of perceptual similarity. Examples are pertur-
bations based on rotations and translations [42], Wasser-
stein distance [41] or SSIM [36].
• Output Imperceptibility: A human observer can not eas-
ily detect irregularities in the classification output when-
ever the adversarial perturbation is applied. For instance,
adversarial examples still lead to plausible traffic situa-
tions and misclassifications are integrated unobtrusively
into their environment.
• Detector Imperceptibility: A predefined selection of
software-based detection systems is not able to detect ir-
regularities in the input, output or in the activation pat-
terns of the ML module caused by the adversarial per-
turbation. Hence, the adversary tries not only to mislead
the victim model, but also adversarial example detectors
placed around the victim model [27, 26].
2.1.2 Adversary’s Knowledge
The knowledge of the adversary can be divided into
”knowledge about the victim model and its parameters”
and ”knowledge about the training data set” [3]. The
publications [21, 19] were used as a basis for the following
list of options.
Model Knowledge: What does the adversary know
about the ML model and its parameters?
• White-box: The adversary has full knowledge of the
model internals, hence is aware of the concrete architec-
ture, all parameter / weight configurations and possibly
even the training strategy.
• Output-transparent Black-box: The adversary can not re-
trieve model parameters, but he can observe all or parts
of the class probabilities or logits of the ML module’s
output.
• Query-limited Black-box: The adversary can not access
relevant model parameters, but he can observe the full
or parts of the module’s output on a limited number of
inputs or with a limited frequency.
• Label-only Black-box: The adversary can neither access
relevant model parameters nor the class probabilities or
logits, but he can observe the full or parts of the final
classification decisions of the system, i.e. only access to
inferred label (argmax layer).
• (Full) Black-box: The adversary can neither retrieve rel-
evant model parameters nor can he directly observe the
output of the ML system. As a consequence, adversar-
ial perturbations have to be created without querying the
victim model.
Data Knowledge: What does the adversary know about the
data sets which have been used to train the ML system?
• Training Data: The full or at least a significant part of the
training data is available to the adversary.
• Surrogate Data: There is no direct access to the original
training data, but the adversary can collect data points
from the relevant underlying data distribution of the vic-
tim model’s environment. In the case of computer vision
for autonomous driving, this is the minimal degree of data
knowledge, since the adversary can always easily gather
images or videos of traffic situations.
2.1.3 Adversary’s Capabilities
Traditionally, this threat model characteristic clarifies the
abilities and constraints of the adversary, thus outlines
the attacker’s power during his attempt to attack the ML
system [3]. In this taxonomy we only investigate attackers
utilizing adversarial perturbations. Thus, the capabilities
of the adversary are fully defined by his means of feeding
perturbations to the victim model.
Input Constraints: How can the adversary feed ma-
licious input to the victim model?
• Digital Data Feed (Direct Data Feed): The attacker can
directly feed digital input to the ML module. Hence, he
can adjust specific float values of input images.
• Physical Data Feed: The adversary can not directly feed
digital input, instead he creates physical perturbations,
e.g. [2, 15]. He has to place these adversarial objects
in the environment of the autonomous car, which finally
fool the module when they appear in the field of view of
the camera.
• Spatial Constraint: It is not possible to place a physical or
digital perturbation over the entire input image. Instead,
the adversary can only influence limited areas of the input
data.
2.2. Attack Strategy
An adversarial perturbation is not fully characterized by
the goals, knowledge and constraints of the adversary. One
is still lacking a few fundamental decisions the adversary
made on his way to the concrete formulation of the adver-
sarial attack which in the end generated the perturbation.
These decisions are always governed by the threat model.
In other words, the taxonomy dimension ”threat model” in-
fluences the decisions summarized in the ”attack strategy”.
The attack strategy should specify what kind of model
and data basis is going to be handed to the attack. Ad-
ditionally, the structure of an adversarial perturbation dif-
fers strongly with the central mathematical procedure used
within the adversarial attack to search for perturbation can-
didates. We therefore propose the following decomposition
of the attack strategy.
2.2.1 Attack Input
With an adversarial perturbation the attacker wants to force
the victim model to make classification mistakes. But, this
does not imply that an adversarial attack is necessarily
taking the true victim model into account during the
generation of the perturbation. Analogously, the attacker
has to decide what kind of data he wants to give to the
attack and this can again deviate from the set defined by his
data knowledge (see: Section 2.1.2).
Model Basis: Which model is used by the adversar-
ial attack?
• Victim Model: The attack primarily utilizes the victim
model in order to calculate adversarial perturbations.
• Surrogate Model: The adversarial attack does not di-
rectly work with the victim model, but considers a sur-
rogate model. This is often necessary if the adversary
has only limited knowledge about the victim model or the
victim model does not allow certain mathematical proce-
dures [22].
Data Basis: Which data basis is used by the adversarial
attack?
• Training Data: Data points of the victim model’s original
training data set are given to the adversarial attack.
• Surrogate Data: The attack is primarily build on data that
is related to the underlying data distribution of the task,
but has not been previously used to train the ML system.
• No Data: The adversary is not giving any task related
data to the attack. Instead, the adversarial attack works
with images that are not samples of the present data dis-
tribution [12].
2.2.2 Mathematical Procedure
With this dimension we try to summarize predominant
mathematical tools that facilitate the detection of suitable
adversarial perturbations. These tools are integrated into
the adversarial attack itself.
Optimization Method: Which mathematical proce-
dure is the key ingredient for the perturbation search of the
attack?
• First-order Methods: The adversarial attack tries to ex-
ploit perturbation directions given by exact or approxi-
mate (sub-)gradients.
• Second-order Methods: The perturbation search is build
on the calculation of the Hessian matrix or approxima-
tions of the Hessian matrix [38].
• Evolution & Random Sampling: The adversarial attack
generates possible perturbations by sampling distribu-
tions and combining promising candidates. One can of-
ten fasten these methods by integrating prior knowledge
about the decision boundary of the ML module [8].
3. The Attack Generator
An adversarial attack consists of two parts: (1) A con-
strained optimization problem that has to be minimized over
admissible perturbations; (2) An optimization method that
searches for approximate solutions of the constrained opti-
mization problem. These two components of an attack are
Figure 1. Adversarial attacks can be viewed as an optimization
problem together with an optimization method. It takes some
model and data set as input in order to create the perturbation.
not always explicitly stated within an attack publication, but
most of the time they are straightforward to derive. As in-
put, the attack usually takes some kind of data set and a
callable model. Potential choices with respect to the attack
input have been discussed in the attack strategy dimension
of the taxonomy (see: Section 2.2.1). On the other hand,
the output of an adversarial attack is the desired adversarial
perturbation or an adversarial example, i.e. a combination of
the perturbation with a specific input data point (see: Figure
1).
Furthermore, the optimization method has also been in-
troduced as a key part of the attack strategy. We presented
various options of the adversary with ”first-order methods”
being the most common choice. Consequently, there is only
one element of Figure 1 where we have not yet clarified its
relation to the above presented taxonomy, namely the opti-
mization problem of the attack. The optimization problem
can abstractly be written as
min
δ
[Obj(F,D)](δ)
s.t. δ ∈ A,
(1)
where [Obj(F,D)](·) is the objective function that takes a
perturbation δ ∈ Rn as input and maps it to some fitness
value in R. Additionally, the objective function depends on
the attack input and, in turn, on the provided ML-model F
and the data set D. Often we can not take any arbitrary per-
turbation δ, but we are rather constrained as introduced in
the taxonomy dimension ”input constraints” (see: Section
2.1.3). Thus, the given input constraints define an admissi-
ble set A, which contains all potential perturbation candi-
dates.
Now, let us take a closer look at the objective function
[Obj(F,D)](·): This function is the mathematical formal-
ization of the goals of the adversary. For the adversary,
minimizing the objective function is equivalent to achiev-
ing his goals with respect to specificity, perturbation imper-
ceptibility and perturbation scope (see: Section 2.1.1). In
order to arrive at this mathematical representation of his
goals, the attacker has to initially define, directly or in-
directly, quantifiers / measures that evaluate the level of
specificityMsp, the level of imperceptibilityMim and the
level of scopeMsc. These are again real-valued functions
which take the perturbation δ as input and additionally de-
pend on the attack input, hence depend on F and the full
or parts of the provided data set D. Thus, if one wants to
be more thorough, one should rather write [Mx(F,D)](δ)
with x ∈ {sp, im, sc}. To make these abstract ideas a lit-
tle bit more tangible, let us discuss a few examples for the
different quantifiers which are frequently used in the adver-
sarial attack literature:
As already mentioned in the introduction, perturbation
imperceptibility has in the past often been measured with
the help of a Lp-norm, mostly L2 or L∞. In these cases
one hasMim(·) = ‖ · ‖p. Please note that we in general do
not pose any mathematical requirements on the real-valued
maps [Mx(F,D)](δ) with x ∈ {sp, im, sc}. If the adver-
sary definesMim(·) = ‖ · ‖p, thenMim(·) is a norm. But,
we can also imagine situations where one might want to
consider distance measures or imperceptibility quantifiers
that do not fulfill the metric or norm axioms. For instance,
if the adversary is interested in detector imperceptibility
(see: Section 2.1.1), then imperceptibility of a perturbation
is equivalent to a set of detectors not recognizing the attack.
This imperceptibility measure does not follow the norm ax-
ioms, e.g. due to binary output, measure is not absolutely
homogeneous. In general, it is of utmost importance that
the attack research looses its strong focus on Lp-norms as
imperceptibility measures, since one can not expect that an
adversary will do the favor of sticking to this one option of
the perturbation imperceptibility taxonomy dimension.
As a specificity measure Msp, attack researchers often
make use of the original loss function l(·, ·) of the ML
model. They insert the desired adversarial outcome yxtar
instead of the true label of data point x ∈ D and define
[Msp(F, x)](δ) := l(F (x + δ), yxtar). In this example we
see the usual dependence ofMsp(·) on the input model F
and the input data set D.
In the majority of existing attacks, the perturbation scope
quantifierMsc is closely connected toMsp. As discussed
in the taxonomy, the desired scope defines in which situa-
tions S ⊆ D the adversarial perturbation should be success-
ful in harming the ML system (see: Section 2.1.1). To eval-
uate this, the adversary often takes Monte Carlo estimates
overMsp(δ), thus
Msc(δ) := 1
N
N∑
i=1
[Msp(F, xi)](δ), (2)
with desired scope data set S = {x1, ..., xN} and N being
the cardinality of S.
Finally, if one has determined these three goal measures,
the objective function [Obj(F,D)](·) is just a composition
of Msp, Mim and Msc. In other words, the selection
of these three measures essentially defines the optimization
problem of the adversarial attack (see: Figure 2). Going
Figure 2. The optimization objective of an adversarial attack can
be viewed as a composition of three adversary’s goal measures.
back to our previous examples, a sample composition is
[Obj(F,D)](δ) :=Msc(δ) + γMim(δ)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[Msp(F, xi)](δ) + γ‖δ‖p
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
l(F (xi + δ), y
xi
tar) + γ‖δ‖p,
(3)
where γ ∈ R>0 is a weighting factor. This gives us the
following attack optimization problem
min
δ
1
N
N∑
i=1
l(F (xi + δ), y
xi
tar) + γ‖δ‖p
s.t. δ ∈ A.
(4)
A lot of the published attack optimization problems intro-
duceMim(δ) as an additional constraint instead of penal-
izing it in the objective function. In the setting of our exam-
ple, this would lead to the following optimization problem
min
δ
1
N
N∑
i=1
l(F (xi + δ), y
xi
tar)
s.t. δ ∈ A, ‖δ‖p ≤ 
(5)
with  > 0 imperceptibility constant. With an appropriate
choice of the weighting constant γ, Equation (4) and (5)
lead to similar, or sometimes even the same, solutions and
therefore, this does not significantly undermine our perspec-
tive on the attack problem presented in Equation (1).
Overall, this gives us the insight that an adversarial attack
consists of various building blocks, which are all linked to
dimensions and options of the adversarial perturbation tax-
onomy (see: Appendix A). Creating a new adversarial at-
tack is now equivalent to assembling adversary’s goal mea-
sures to form an optimization objective and equipping this
with a suitable optimization method. The choice of the op-
timization method has to acknowledge constraints given by
the input model and input data as well as additional con-
straints on the perturbation.
This modular view on an adversarial attack also outlines
the path to the creation of sets of adversarial attacks instead
of publishing one attack at a time. We have seen that the
specificity, imperceptibility and scope quantifiers crucially
define the adversarial attack. Thus, by investigating new
measures of these kinds, one implicitly provides a number
of new adversarial objective functions, namely all possible
combinations with other adversary’s goal measures. Finally,
this results in a set of new adversarial attacks. In the con-
text of computer vision systems for autonomous driving, re-
searchers could therefore go through the options listed in
Section 2.1.1 and assign suitable quantifiers. This approach
also helps us derive new adversarial attacks from existing
ones by inserting alternative adversary’s goal measures. In
the following, we will underline the benefit of our con-
ceptual ideas by experimenting with the attacks presented
in [27].
4. Experiments
We want to analyze two attacks introduced in [27] to fur-
ther clarify the concepts presented in Section 3. Addition-
ally, we show how the modular view facilitates the deduc-
tion of new adversarial attacks from existing ones.
Metzen et al. [27] showed the existence of targeted, uni-
versal adversarial perturbations for state-of-the-art semantic
segmentation neural networks. To generate these perturba-
tions, Metzen et al. try to solve
min
δ
1
N
N∑
i=1
l(F (xi + δ), y
xi
tar)
s.t. δ ∈ Rm×n×3, ‖δ‖∞ ≤ ,
(6)
where D = {x1, ..., xN} ⊆ Rm×n×3 is the whole training
data set of the victim model F . The model output F (x)
consists of class probability vectors for every pixel of the
input image x ∈ Rm×n×3. Equivalently to the example of
Section 3, the function l(·, ·) denotes the loss function of the
ML module, i.e. in this semantic segmentation setting
l(F (x), y) :=
1
|I|
∑
(i,j)∈I
Jcls(F (x)i,j , yi,j), (7)
with (i, j) ∈ I spatial dimensions of an image and Jcls(·, ·)
the cross entropy classification loss.
To solve the optimization problem of Equation (6), they
follow an iterative gradient descent scheme, thus they ex-
ploit the white-box knowledge of the victim model by using
a first-order optimization method. However, the key contri-
bution of Metzen et al. is the proposed generation of the
adversarial targets yxtar. As already mentioned in Section
2.1.1, they distinguish between a static and dynamic speci-
ficity target. In the static target case, one specific target
segmentation is chosen for all input images, i.e. yxtar := yst
for all x ∈ D. For the dynamic target of removing a certain
classification class, yxtar := y
x
dy is determined by applying
a nearest-neighbor heuristic to the predicted classification
decision yxpred of the network. To be more precise, one sub-
stitutes all one-hot vectors of the target class by one-hot vec-
tors which encode the nearest alternative non-target class.
Now, let us take a look at the static and dynamic attack
with the attack generator perspective of Section 3: As the
imperceptibility measure we clearly have Mim(·) = ‖ ·
‖∞, i.e. imperceptibility is measured by the L∞-norm of
the perturbation. The two attacks differ in their specificity
objective, namely
Mstsp(δ) = l(F (x+ δ), yst)
Mdysp(δ) = l(F (x+ δ), yxdy),
(8)
with adversarial targets yst and yxdy generated as described
above. The scope measure is identical for the static as well
as for the dynamic attack formulation. It is just the Monte
Carlo estimation of the chosen specificity measure over the
whole training set, thus
Msc(δ) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
[Mcsp(F, xi)](δ), (9)
with c ∈ {st, dy}. We recognize again that the attack op-
timization objective (see: Equation (6)) is a composition of
the just defined adversary’s goal measures and we are in an
analog setting as in the example of Section 3 (see: Equa-
tions (4), (5)).
After having worked out the different building blocks
of the attacks, one can now think about exchanging dif-
ferent elements in order to derive new attacks on seman-
tic segmentation modules. Recall that an adversarial attack
consists of an optimization problem and an optimization
method (see: Figure 1). Thus, one potential adaptation is
the selection of a different optimization method. Within the
attack strategy taxonomy dimension we provided two op-
tions other than first-order methods. Especially applying
evolution & random sampling strategies might be benefi-
cial, because they facilitate a perturbation search even if the
adversary does not have full knowledge about the seman-
tic segmentation module. However, we want to focus on
changes concerning the attack optimization problem given
by Equation (6). Changes here are basically equivalent to
exchanging one or more of the three adversary’s goal mea-
sures.
Metzen et al. discuss static and dynamic targets, but
they do not address untargeted or confusion specificity ob-
jectives (see: Section 2.1.1). A potential confusion goal
could be to enlarge a target class, e.g. increase size of
pedestrian class. This can be achieved by substituting the
original specificity measures by the very similar measure
Mcosp(δ) = l(F (x + δ), yxco), where yxco is the adversarial
confusion target for input image x ∈ D. The only differ-
ence is the generation of the target segmentation yxco. In-
spired by the original versions of the attacks, we again use a
Figure 3. Sample results of adapted semantic segmentation attacks on ICNet with single image as attack input (N=1): (1) First column:
Attack input image with original prediction of ICNet; (2) First row of right three columns - confusion: Attack enlarges pedestrian class ( =
15); (3) Second row of right three columns - attention-based imperceptibility: Attack removes pedestrian class with flow field perturbation.
nearest-neighbor heuristic together with the predicted clas-
sification decisions yxpred to craft y
x
co. However, this time
we exchange the one-hot vectors of the nearest-neighbors of
our target class and always insert the one-hot vector of the
target class. This automatically leads to a target segmenta-
tion with an enlarged target class. For the implementation
of this target generation, we used the nearest-neighbor in-
terpolation of the OpenCV resize method [6]. Keeping all
other adversary’s goal quantifiers the same, this gives us a
confusion semantic segmentation attacks. Figure 3 shows
a sample result of this adapted attack on a self-trained IC-
Net for real-time semantic segmentation [44] (see also: Ap-
pendix B).
If one wants to keep the initial static and dynamic speci-
ficity measures, we could alternatively experiment with dif-
ferent imperceptibility quantifiers Mim. Within the pro-
posed taxonomy, we presented attention-based impercep-
tibility as an alternative option to Lp-based imperceptibil-
ity. This imperceptibility option contains a lot of interesting
perturbation concepts, e.g. adversarial perturbations gen-
erated through spatial transformation [42]. In the spatial
transformation setting, the adversarial perturbation is a flow
field δ ∈ Rm×n×2 which summarizes the per-pixel trans-
formations of an image x in order to get to the adversarial
example xadv . Hence, xadv = [T (δ)](x) with T being the
function that applies the transformations of δ to the origi-
nal image x. As an imperceptibility measure, one can then
consider the total variation TV (·) of the flow field δ:
Mim(δ) = TV (δ)
=
∑
(i,j)∈I
∑
(k,l)∈N (i,j)
‖δ(i,j) − δ(k,l)‖2, (10)
where N (i, j) are the image coordinates of the 4-pixel
neighbors of coordinate (i, j) ∈ I. Note that δ is a flow field
and hence δ(i,j) ∈ R2 for any spatial dimension (i, j) ∈ I.
With this in mind, we can formulate an attention-based ver-
sion of the presented semantic segmentation attacks:
min
δ
1
N
N∑
i=1
l(F ([T (δ)](xi)), y
xi
tar) + γ TV (δ)
s.t. δ ∈ Rm×n×2,
(11)
with γ weighting factor and yxitar the static or dynamic tar-
get label of image xi. In Figure 3, we present an exemplary
result of this attack on a traffic situation containing a pedes-
trian (see also: Appendix B).
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a comprehensive adversarial
perturbation taxonomy together with options for the adver-
sary linked to every taxonomy dimension. We describe ad-
versarial attacks as a composition of various elements which
are closely related to the options of the given taxonomy. In
particular, we illustrate the crucial role of adversary’s goal
measures in the creation of new adversarial attacks. This
structured view on adversarial attacks facilitates the con-
struction of sets of new attacks by investigating new speci-
ficity, perturbation imperceptibility and perturbation scope
measures. Our experimental adaptations of existing seman-
tic segmentation attacks demonstrate the benefits of this
modular view on adversarial attacks.
We propose a change of the publication style of adver-
sarial attacks. We are convinced that a stronger focus on the
exploration of new potential attack building blocks, instead
of presenting fully assembled attacks, will help structure the
adversarial attack research field and furthermore, will fasten
the development of large, diverse sets of benchmark adver-
sarial attacks.
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Table 1. Building block analysis of existing adversarial attacks.
B. Sample Results
Figure 4. Sample results of adapted semantic segmentation attacks with confusion target or attention-based imperceptibility. Attack input
is a self-trained ICNet and a single image (N=1,  = 15).
